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THE GENDER GAP IN TOP CORPORATE JOBS
MARIANNE BERTRAND and KEVIN F. HALLOCK*
Using the ExecuComp data set, which contains information on the five
highest-paid executives in each of a large number of U.S. firms for the years
1992–97, the authors examine the gender compensation gap among high-level
executives.  Women, who represented about 2.5% of the sample, earned about
45% less than men.  As much as 75% of this gap can be explained by the fact that
women managed smaller companies and were less likely to be CEO, Chair, or
company President.  The unexplained gap falls to less than 5% with an allowance
for the younger average age and lower average seniority of the female execu-
tives.  These results do not rule out the possibility of discrimination via gender
segregation or unequal promotion.  Between 1992 and 1997, however, women
nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and also strongly
improved their relative compensation, mostly by gaining representation in
larger corporations.
*Marianne Bertrand is Assistant Professor of Eco-
nomics at the Graduate School of Business at the
University of Chicago, Faculty Research Fellow at the
National Bureau of Economic Research, and an Affili-
ate of CEPR.  Kevin Hallock is Associate Professor of
Economics and of Labor and Industrial Relations at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
For helpful comments, the authors thank seminar
participants at the University of Illinois, Stanford
University, and the joint meeting of the Society of
Labor Economists and European Society of Labour
Economists in Milan, as well as Marianne Ferber,
Peter Feuille, Todd Fister, Wallace Hendricks, John
Johnson, and Craig Olson.  Sherrilyn Billger pro-
vided outstanding research assistance.
1See, for example, Catalyst (1999), Morris (1998),
Jones (1999), and Meyer (1999).
Some of the data used in this study are from
Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data base and must
be purchased from Standard and Poor’s.  Computer
programs used in the analysis are available from the
authors upon request.  The first drafts of this paper
were written while Bertrand was on the faculty at
Princeton and Hallock was visiting the Industrial
Relations Section at Princeton.  E-mail:  marianne.
bertrand@gsb.uchicago.edu; hallock@uiuc.edu.
his paper analyzes gender differences
among top executives in a large set of
U.S. public corporations.  Our motivation
for undertaking this study is twofold.  First
and foremost is the fact that, notwithstand-
ing the curiosity this topic raises both in the
media and in policy circles,1 we know of no
systematic study to date of how well women
are doing in top corporate jobs.  We pro-
vide the first detailed description of the
relative position of female top executives in
the 1990s.
Our second motivation is more academic.
Problems plaguing many past studies of the
gender pay gap—in particular, unobserved
characteristics of both workers and jobs—
are likely to be less present in this specific
occupational group.  Most of the previous
work has indeed identified an unexplained
gender gap that cannot be attributed to
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observable differences between men and
women.2  While this unexplained gap could
be due to labor market discrimination, it
could also be attributable to differences
between men and women that are unob-
servable (at least to the econometrician),
such as a relative lack of long-term career
commitment among women.3  It is reason-
able to assume that such unobservable dif-
ferences are minimized in the group of top
executives we propose to study.  Men and
women in this sample are likely to be simi-
lar in that both share a high level of job
motivation and high career ambitions.
Several authors have previously exam-
ined gender pay differences among the
highly paid.  Examples include investiga-
tions of lawyers by Wood, Corcoran, and
Courant (1993), and Biddle and
Hamermesh (1998); of university faculty by
Barbezat (1987), Barbezat and Hughes
(1990), Ferber and Greene (1982), Gander
(1997), Hoffman (1976), Johnson and
Stafford (1974), Katz (1973), and Ransom
and Megdal (1993); of engineers by Mor-
gan (1998); of physicians by Baker (1995);
and of firm managers in the United King-
dom by Gregg and Machin (1993).4  No one
before, however, has focused on gender
compensation differentials among top ex-
ecutives.  There have been two substantial
barriers to conducting an investigation such
as ours.  First, the required data simply did
not exist before.  Second, it has been widely
believed that too few women were in these
top positions to carry out a formal analysis
of their relative pay.
We use Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp
data, which contain information on com-
pensation for the top five executives for all
firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and
S&P SmallCap 600 for the years 1992–97.
Included is information on base salary,
bonus, and the value of granted stock op-
tions in the current year.5  The ExecuComp
data set has three main advantages for our
purpose.  First, it is very large.  The sample
we use in most of our analysis includes
more than 42,000 executive-year observa-
tions.  All publicly traded firms are re-
quired to disclose the names and compen-
sation of the “top five” highest-paid em-
ployees annually.  This large sample size is
especially important for us because we want
to estimate gender differences with suffi-
cient statistical precision in an economic
sector where female representation is small.
A second advantage of the data set is that it
covers a variety of occupational categories
among the top managerial jobs and not
only Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).  We
are thus able to investigate the importance
of occupational differences at the top.  Fi-
nally, because the data set covers a wide
cross-section of firms, the role of firm size
and industrial specialization in the gender
compensation gap can be assessed.
The Gender Gap
The ExecuComp data set is unique for
many reasons, including its wide variety of
measures of compensation, details concern-
ing firm characteristics, and large sample
size.  We can also arrange the data as a
2An exception is Groshen (1991).  Groshen showed
that most of the gender gap can be attributed to sex
segregation rather than wage differences by sex within
occupation, industries, and establishments.  Using a
larger sample but a similar empirical methodology,
Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999),
however, found that a large part of the sex gap re-
mains unexplained after accounting for sex segrega-
tion.
3Of course, it is also possible that lower pay leads
to lower career commitment.  In addition, it could be
that some compensating differential exists whereby
women on average select lower-paying jobs than men
and, at the same time, enjoy amenities on these jobs
that the higher-paying jobs lack.  We cannot explore
this issue empirically in this paper.
4Gregg and Machin (1993) explored pay gaps for
a much more general class of managers than the class
we focus on.  Another study that focuses on such
lower-level managers for the United States is Jacobs
(1992).
5Most studies of CEO pay do not include the value
of stock options granted in a given year.  Hall and
Liebman (1998), however, documented the growing
importance of granted options in the compensation
of CEOs since the early 1980s.  ExecuComp reports
this information, and we have included it in our total
compensation measure.
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panel, since we have multiple observations
on a set of firms over time.  Most crucial for
our work, however, is the identification of
the gender of each manager.  Given the
substantial discussion of a dearth of women
in managerial positions in the United States
(see, for example, Catalyst 1999), we were
concerned that examining the question of
a compensation gap would be difficult.
However, due to ExecuComp’s substantial
size, we were able to identify more than
1,134 female executive-year observations
(449 unique individuals) on the basis of the
gender variable included in the data.  This
is roughly 2.4% of all observations in the
sample.
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes mean
compensation by gender for the basic
ExecuComp sample.  The table displays
total compensation but also decomposes
total compensation into its major elements:
salary, bonus, other annual compensation,
and the value of options granted in the
current year.  Pooling all the ExecuComp
years together, total compensation was, on
average, 33% lower for women than for
men.6  On average, women earned a little
Table 1.  Summary Statistics on Compensation, 1992–97.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristic All Managers Men Women p-Valuea
Panel A:  High-Level Managersb
Total Current Payc 1,323.0 1,333.7 894.1 0.000
(13.8) (14.1) (58.1)
Salary 336.3 338.6 246.9 0.000
(1.0) (1.0) (6.1)
Bonus 257.6 260.7 136.1 0.000
(3.8) (3.8) (8.4)
Other Annual Payd 20.6 20.8 12.7 0.006
(0.7) (0.7) (2.8)
Value Granted Optionse 489.7 492.6 370.8 0.003
(10.5) (10.7) (39.5)
N 46,708 45,574 1,134
Panel B:  Managers from CPSf
Annual Labor Earnings 45.6 52.4 36.0 0.000
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
N 73,411 43,011 30,400
Sources:  The data on high-level managers in panel A are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for
1992–1997.  The data on managers from the CPS are from the 1992 to 1997 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups
of the Current Population Survey.
Notes:  All data are reported in real 1997 thousands of dollars adjusted using the consumer price index.
aThis is the p-value for the difference in sample means between men and women within each row.
bHigh-level managers include the top five highest-paid executives in each firm in the ExecuComp database.
cTotal current pay is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual pay, and the value of stock options granted in the
current year.
dOther annual pay includes the dollar value of annual compensation not categorized as salary or bonus.
eValue of granted options is the value of stock options granted in the current period.  This is not the value
of options cashed in in a given year.
fThe managers from the CPS are the set of full-time workers who report an occupation category between 3
and 22 in the 1980 Census of Population Occupation Classification.  Annual income is constructed from average
weekly earnings.
6When we later control for year effects, the gender
gap in total compensation reaches about 45%, the
number reported in the introductory paragraphs.
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less than $900,000 (1997 dollars) in total
compensation, compared to more than $1.3
million for the average male executive.
How does the gender gap among top-
level managers compare to that among
lower-level managers?  Panel B addresses
this question.  We use the Merged Outgo-
ing Rotation Groups of the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS) over the same period,
1992–97.  Given that the ExecuComp data
are so specialized, we define a manager as
anyone reporting that he or she worked in
an “executive, administrative and manage-
rial occupation,” excluding “management
related occupations.”7  We focus on full-
time workers only, that is, individuals who
worked at least 35 hours per week.  Annual
salaries are constructed based on average
weekly earnings.  One can see that the
gender earnings gap among middle-level
managers is very similar to that among top
managers:  about 46%.
We now consider gender differences in
the composition of the compensation pack-
age.  Several features are worth noticing.
First, women seem to have received a larger
share of their compensation in the form of
stock options than did men.  This pattern
may reflect the fact that the sample of
women was larger in the later years, when
the use of stock options was more com-
mon.8  Also, compared to men, women
received less compensation in the form of
bonuses and more in the form of salary.
Decomposing the Gender Gap
In this section, we investigate how vari-
ous characteristics of female top executive
employment might account for the gender
gap.  We explore issues such as firm size,
industrial segregation, occupational segre-
gation, and individual demographic char-
acteristics.
The Role of Firm Size
Women in top managerial positions
tended to work for much smaller corpora-
tions than did men.  Panel A of Table 2
clearly illustrates this fact.  Female execu-
tives’ firms were 35–45% smaller, whether
size is measured as the value of shareholder
wealth, sales, total assets, or number of
employees.9  In an analysis not reported
here, we found that companies of extreme
size were chiefly responsible for the rela-
tionship between firm size and gender.  We
computed the fraction of women by deciles
of firm market value.  Women constituted
about 3.5% of top management employ-
ment in the bottom two deciles and only
1% in the top decile.  In all the other
deciles, the fraction of women fluctuated
between roughly 2% and 3%, and the de-
cline was not monotonic in size.
It is a well-known fact in the executive
compensation literature that CEOs tend to
be paid more the larger the firm’s size
(Murphy 1985; Kostiuk 1990; Rosen 1992).
If this pay-size correlation also holds for
other top executives, it is reasonable to ask
how much of the gender gap can be attrib-
uted to the under-representation of women
in large firms.  The first columns of Table 3
answer this question.
The dependent variable for all regres-
sions in Table 3 is the logarithm of real total
compensation.  All regressions in the paper
(Tables 3, 6, 8, and 9) include yearly time
indicators, and standard errors are White-
corrected standard errors. One can see in
column (1) that the gender gap is larger,
44%, when one controls for year effects
Controlling for year effects is crucial, because, as we
will show below (in the section “Trends in Participa-
tion and Earnings”), the number of women was larger
in the later years of the sample, when compensation
levels were on average higher.
7This corresponds to categories 3–22 in the 1980
Census of Population Occupation Classification.
Obviously, this definition formally also includes
higher-level managers.  But because this group is
small, most of the individuals in the CPS sample are
lower-level managers.
8See the section “Trends in Participation and Earn-
ings.”
9Shareholder wealth is the total number of shares
times the year-end share price.  The correlation be-
tween ln(shareholder wealth) and ln(assets) is 0.8;
between ln(shareholder wealth) and ln(number of
employees), 0.7; and between ln(assets) and
ln(employees), 0.7.
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than the gap implied by Table 1, which
does not control for any covariates.  This
can be explained by the fact that there are
more observations for women in the later
sample years.  Column (2) shows that the
gender gap is, as we had expected, substan-
tially reduced when we control for the value
of shareholder wealth.  The elasticity of
managerial compensation to the value of
shareholder wealth is about 0.4.10  About a
third of the gender compensation differen-
tial, or 15 percentage points, can be ac-
counted for by the lower participation of
women in large firms.
The Role of Industrial Segregation
The female executives in our sample were
not uniformly represented in all industrial
sectors.  This can be seen in Table 4.  Women
were more likely to be managing compa-
nies that specialized in health and social
services and in trade.  These were also
sectors in which a disproportionate share
of lower-level managers were women, as we
can see from the CPS results in column 6.
In contrast, very few women held top-level
positions in agriculture, construction, min-
ing, and “heavy” manufacturing industries.
The banking sector is an interesting case.
While it had the largest share of women in
lower-level management among all sectors,
the share of women at the top was lower
than in most other sectors.11  Does the
Table 2.  Firm and Manager Characteristics.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Characteristic All Managers Men Women p-Valuea
Panel A:  Firms
Market Value (millions) 3,768.7 3,799.3 2,538.3 0.000
(45.7) (46.4) (245.4)
Salesb (millions) 3,423.6 3,470.9 1,893.5 0.000
(42.1) (43.0) (117.9)
Assetsc (millions) 7,473.0 7,525 5,379.6 0.000
(117.2) (119.1) (644.6)
Employeesd (thousands) 16.9 17.1 9.2 0.001
(0.2) (0.2) (0.5)
Ne 46,708 45,574 1,134
Panel B:  Managers
Age 52.6 52.6 47.5 0.000
(0.5) (0.06) (0.5)
N 17,236 16,960 276
Seniority 13.2 13.3 7.7 0.000
(0.1) (0.1) (0.5)
N 14,189 13,845 344
Source:  The data are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 1992–97.
aP-value for difference in sample means by gender for each variable.
bSample sizes for sales are 46,665, 45,533, and 1,132.
cSample sizes for assets are 46,703, 45,569, and 1,134.
dSample sizes for employees are 45,581, 44,482, and 1,099.
eSample size for Market Value.  This size variable is used in most of the analysis below.
10This elasticity is slightly higher than that docu-
mented in Rosen (1992) for CEOs only.
11Bird (1990) previously documented substantial
growth of female employment in bank management
starting in the 1970s, partly as a result of pressures by
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC).  She further noticed that these women
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apparent industrial segregation of female
executives account for some of the gender
gap in compensation?  The data reported
in Table 4 show no obvious pattern of a
concentration of women in low-wage indus-
tries.  While managers in health and social
services as well as in trade were paid slightly
less than the average manager in the sample,
managers in the industries where women
were very scarce were paid below average,
too.
Columns (3)–(5) in Table 3 confirm this
observation in a more rigorous statistical
way.  Columns (3) and (4) show that the
female dummy variable stays unchanged
whether we add 8 broad industry dummies
or 115 finer dummies.  Moreover, none of
the gender gap remaining after controlling
for firm size (column 2) can be accounted
for by the differential representation of
women in different industries (column 5).
In summary, there is no evidence of a sys-
tematic allocation of women in low-paying
industries.
The Role of Occupational Segregation
Table 5 presents the share of women in
various occupations.  We constructed occu-
pational categories based on the “title” vari-
able in ExecuComp.  There are more than
5,100 unique occupation tit les in
ExecuComp.  Some of these titles clearly
represent similar occupations.  For example,
“ex. vp” and “exec. vp” are just different
ways of representing executive vice presi-
dent.  But many are more complicated and
cannot naturally be merged together.  We
broke the occupation categories into 31
unique groupings, including Chair and
CEO, Vice-Chair, President, Chief Finan-
cial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Of-
ficer (COO), and so on.  Because some of
the executives in the sample reported more
than one occupation in their job title, we
constructed two different occupational cat-
egories for the first and second occupation
reported for each manager in ExecuComp.
The occupational breakdown reported
in Table 5 is a further consolidation of our
31 categories into only 11 based on the first
occupation reported, except for the Chair
and CEO category.  Indeed, as most of the
CEOs in the sample are also Chairs of their
Table 3.  Gender Pay Gap for High-Level Executives.
(Dependent Variable is the Log of Total Compensation;
White-Corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female –0.44*** –0.28*** –0.44** –0.43*** –0.27***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Market Value 0.37*** 0.39***
(0.004) (0.005)
Stock Return/1,000 0.04 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
8 Industries no no yes no no
115 Industries no no no yes yes
Constant 6.48*** 3.86*** 6.48*** 6.48*** 3.89***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
R2 0.030 0.345 0.056 0.177 0.410
N 46,670 46,670 46,670 46,670 46,670
Source:  The data are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 1992–97.
Notes:  All regressions control for time indicator variables.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
tended to be mostly employed in retail banking and
especially branch management, where chances of
advancement were very low.
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companies and sometimes reported their
title as “CEO and Chairman” and some-
times as “Chairman and CEO,” all respon-
dents who reported at least one of these
occupations in their title were put in the
“CEO/Chair” category.  Finally, we ranked
these occupations based on our intuitive
assessment of their relative prestige.  Col-
umn (3) of Table 5 reports the mean com-
pensation for each occupation relative to
the overall mean compensation in the
sample.  This confirms that our intuition
was roughly correct except with respect to
CFOs, whose relatively low compensation
on average in our sample came as a surprise
to us.
The most important fact in Table 5 is the
under-representation of women in the top
three occupational categories and top four
occupations (Chair, CEO, Vice-Chair, and
President).12  Women who had made it into
the top managerial level (that is, they were
in the ExecuComp sample) were less likely
to be at the very top than were men.13  The
fraction of women among CEOs, Chairs,
and Vice-Chairs was much less than 1%.
There were also fewer female presidents
than there would have been if female top
executives were randomly distributed across
occupations.14  Once we look beyond these
Table 4.  Relative Pay, Percent Female, and
Female/Male Wage Gaps by Broad Industry Categories.
High-Level Managers Managers from the CPS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
% Industry Female/ % Industry Female/
Number Female Wage/ Male Number Female Wage/ Male
in in Market Wage Gap in in Market Wage Gap
Industry Industry Industry Wage in Industry Industry Industry Wage in Industry
Agriculture 222 0.00 0.60 — 312 42.63 0.77 .75***
Mining, Oil, Construction 3,197 1.38 0.93 0.47*** 4,338 18.21 1.01 .72***
Food, Tobacco, Textile 6,361 2.63 0.99 0.81 3,953 31.77 1.08 .76***
Chemical, Concrete, Autos 10,252 1.11 0.93 0.49*** 10,486 22.20 1.23 .76***
Transport, Communication 6,112 2.45 0.77 0.49*** 6,495 31.25 1.10 .82***
Wholesale / Retail Goods 5,484 3.61 0.81 0.65*** 10,671 40.72 0.76 .71***
Banking 5,593 2.34 1.49 0.61*** 8,975 50.14 1.05 .69***
Personal & Business Serv. 5,378 3.18 1.20 0.89 9,296 39.46 0.88 .77***
Health and Social Services 4,109 3.87 0.95 0.62*** 18,958 60.07 0.99 .74***
Source:  The data on high-level managers are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 1992–97.
The data on managers from the CPS are from the 1992 to 1997 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current
Population Survey.
***Significant at the 0.001 level or better.
12This is an example of what is known as vertical
segregation (see Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998).
Also see Ferber and Loeb (1997) for a related ex-
ample in higher education.
13Note, however, that in column 4 we report the
ratio of the average pay of women to the average pay
of men within occupations.  For the CEO/Chair
category, this ratio is positive and marginally signifi-
cant (p-value 0.08).  It appears that although very few
women made it to this top spot, once they got there,
their average compensation (without considering
control variables) was quite high.
14This finding is consistent with a vast prior litera-
ture that has shown that a substantial part of the
difference in pay between men and women is attribut-
able to the fact that women are less likely to hold the
higher-paying jobs.  See, among others, Goldin (1990)
and Blau and Ferber (1987).  While sex segregation
by occupation can be reconciled with some form of
taste discrimination by employers, employees, or cus-
tomers (Becker 1957; Arrow 1973), many authors
have preferred to rely on human capital models to
explain this fact.  See Lazear and Rosen (1990) for
one such model.  Another interpretation is offered by
Reskin and Ross (1990) and Strober (1984).
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four top occupations, there is also an ap-
parent negative correlation between the
fraction of female executives in an occupa-
tion and relative compensation in that oc-
cupation, but the correlation is far from
strong.  For example, women were over-
represented among CFOs whose compen-
sation was relatively lower than we initially
expected, but CFOs were still paid more
than most of the categories of Vice Presi-
dents.
In Table 6, we turn to a regression analy-
sis in order to more precisely quantify the
impact of sex segregation by occupation on
the gender earnings gap.  The sample of
executives for which we can construct occu-
pation is about 9% smaller than the origi-
nal sample.  The unconditional gender gap
in this sample is 47% (column 1 in Table 6)
and is not statistically different from the
44% gap found in Table 3 (which covers
the entire sample).  The scarcity of female
CEOs and Chairs only explains as much as
13% of the compensation differentials (col-
umn 2).  Nearly half of the 47% gap can be
explained by the scarcity of women in the
top four occupations of Chair, CEO, Vice
Chair, and President (column 4).  If one
further controls for firm size (column 5),
the gender compensation differential falls
to 12%.  Interestingly, adding further occu-
pational controls only very weakly reduces
the remaining gender compensation gap
(columns 6–8 relative to column 4).  Add-
ing more than 60 detailed controls for both
first and second occupations in the job title
(column 9) reduces the gender gap by an-
other 7 percentage points compared to
column (4).
Finally, columns (10) and (11) of Table
6 examine the combined effect of occupa-
tional segregation, industrial segregation,
and firm size.  As noted above, industry
indicators do not reduce the coefficient on
the female indicator at all (compare col-
umn 8 to column 10).  Controlling for firm
size after controlling for occupational cat-
egories (column 11) still has a large effect
on the female dummy.  The magnitude of
the effect, however, is smaller than in Table
3.  This very likely indicates that women
were even less likely to hold the top jobs
when they worked for larger corporations.
By constructing occupational categories
based on the job title variable, we were also
able to extract information on broad field
of activity for a subsample of the observa-
tions (see Appendix table).  Women’s rep-
resentation was highest in fields such as
human resources, utility services, and retail
Table 5.  Relative Pay, Percent Female, and
Female/Male Compensation Gaps by Broad Occupation Groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number % Occupation Female/Male
in Female in Wage/ Wage Gap
Position Occupation Occupation Market Wage in Occupation
CEO / Chair 8,987 0.52 1.93 1.75*
Vice Chair 2,000 0.85 1.53 0.50***
President 5,840 1.71 1.30 0.58***
CFO 326 6.44 0.61 0.67
COO 164 1.83 1.16 0.61
Other “Chief” Officer 2,155 1.58 1.48 0.47***
Executive VP 8,581 2.66 0.83 1.10
Senior VP 8,006 3.45 0.56 0.88**
Group VP 493 0.81 0.44 0.91
VP 7,468 4.27 0.37 0.79***
Other Occupations 695 2.88 0.55 0.40***
Source:  The data are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 1992–97.
***Means for men and women are significantly different at the 0.01 level; **at the 0.05 level; *at the 0.10
level.
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banking.  Controlling for field in addition
to occupation did not affect the coefficient
on the female indicator variable.  We do
not report these results in the tables.
In column (12) of Table 6, we allow for
firm-specific effects in pay and add indi-
vidual firm fixed effects to the regression.15
The chi-squared value of the Hausman test
of fixed-effects versus random effects is
highly significant (p-value less than 0.001)
and indicates that inferences based on the
firm fixed effects specification in column
(12) of Table 6 are most appropriate.  In
any event, the coefficient estimate on fe-
male when controlling for individual firm
fixed effects (–0.13) is nearly identical to
that in the previous specification with in-
dustry fixed effects (–0.11 in column 11).16
Oaxaca Decomposition
Another way to consider wage gaps be-
tween groups is described in Oaxaca (1973).
This method decomposes the overall gap
into a portion that is due to differences in
observable skills between groups and a part
that is still unexplained.  This is easily done
by running separate regressions for men
and women and then rewriting the overall
wage gap in various ways as described be-
low.  First, define αf and βf (a vector) as
coefficient estimates from a regression of
log compensation on a constant and a set of
covariates for women only and X
–
f (a vector)
as the mean characteristics of women.  αm,βm, and X
–
m are similarly defined for men.
The overall gap between men and women is
(1) ∆w = αm + βmX
–
m – αf – βfX
–
f
There are two popular ways to re-write this
equation.  The first is based on adding and
subtracting βmX
–
f, which yields
(2) ∆w = (αm – αf) +
(βm – βf)X
–
f + βm (X
–
m – X
–
f).
In this case we are assuming that the re-
turns to male characteristics, βm, are the
baseline.  The second common decomposi-
tion is found by adding and subtracting
βfX
–
m to equation (1), which yields
(3) ∆w = (αm – αf) +
(βm – βf)X
–
m + βf(X
–
m – X
–
f).
In this case we are assuming that the re-
turns to female characteristics, βf , are the
baseline.17  In both equations (2) and (3),
the first two terms are the part of the total
gap left unexplained and the third term is
the part of the gap due to explained differ-
ences in skills.
We present results for a simple Oaxaca
(1973) decomposition in Table 7.  In this
case, we use the covariates used in column
(5) of Table 6:  year indicators, indicators
for the top three occupations, log stock
market value, and stock return in the previ-
ous year.  We chose this parsimonious speci-
fication because, as indicated by Table 6,
these covariates alone account for nearly
all of the explained variation in compensa-
tion.  As stated above, we decompose the
total gap assuming that the male wage struc-
ture is the true wage structure (as in equa-
tion 2) and then assuming that the female
wage structure is the true wage structure
(as in equation 3).  The results in Table 7
confirm our previous findings.  Most of the
total gap in compensation by gender for
these top managers (between 71% = 0.30/
0.42 and 88% = 0.37/0.42) was due to ob-
servable differences between men and
women.18
The Role of Age and Tenure
A major drawback of the ExecuComp
data set is that it does not report age and
tenure consistently for all observations.
15In this case, we cannot also control for industry,
since industry does not vary within firms (for the most
part).
16We also re-computed this specification with an
individual person random effect model.  In this case,
the coefficient on female is nearly identical, –0.12.
17Of course, these are just extreme cases, and any
combination of βm and βf  could also be a possibility
(see Ransom and Oaxaca 1994).
18Further details of the decomposition, including
the separate regressions by gender, are available from
the authors on request.
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Table 7.  Basic Oaxaca Decomposition.
Unexplained Gap Due to
Decomposition Total Gap Gap Skill Differences
Oaxaca Decomposition #1 (returns to male are baseline) 0.42 0.12 0.30
Oaxaca Decomposition #2 (returns to female are baseline) 0.42 0.05 0.37
Source:  The data are from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database for 1992–97.
Note:  Separate regressions are run for men and women (see text).  All regressions control for time indicator
variables, status as CEO, Chair, Vice Chair, President, log(market value), and shareholder return.
These two variables are available for only a
subset of the observations in the sample.19
Focusing on that subsample of the data,
Panel B of Table 2 shows that women in
these top managerial jobs were very similar
to men with respect to their labor force
attachment and career commitment, but
differed considerably from their male coun-
terparts with respect to age and seniority in
their corporations.  Women in the
subsample for which age and tenure are
available were about 5 years younger than
the men, on average (47.5 versus 52.6 years
old), and had 5.6 fewer years of seniority in
their company (7.7 versus 13.3 years).  (It is
interesting to note that the gaps in age and
tenure are about the same.)  Because re-
turns to age and experience are large in the
market for executives, we expect that the
relative youth and low seniority of the fe-
male executives is another important de-
terminant of the gender gap.  This is for-
mally shown in Table 8.
Because the sample used in this section
is much smaller, we re-estimate the uncon-
ditional gender compensation gap for this
group.  As seen in column (1) of Table 8,
the point estimate on the female indicator,
–0.61, is substantially larger than in the
previous larger samples.  Yet, standard er-
rors are large.  Once we control for firm
size (as in column 2), the remaining gen-
der gap is again much smaller.  If we further
add the three top occupation dummies (col-
umn 3), the gap falls to 8%.  However,
standard errors are again large, and we
cannot reject the possibility that the coeffi-
cient on the female indicator variable is
either 0 or the same as the female dummy
in the larger sample for the same set of
controls (column 5 of Table 6).  If we
control for occupation effects (column 4),
the point estimate for the female dummy
drops to –0.05, and if we control for both
occupation and industry effects (column
5), it drops to –0.09.  Again, because stan-
dard errors are large, we cannot reject the
possibility that the coefficients on the fe-
male dummies are the same as the corre-
sponding ones in Table 6.
The women’s relative youth cannot in
itself fully explain the gender gap.  Column
(6) of Table 8 shows that a 33% difference
in compensation still exists between men
and women after we account for age and
seniority.  However, this is not precisely
estimated.  There is also a clear but imper-
fect correlation between executives’ age
and the size of the companies they man-
aged.  When age and tenure are included
(last five columns of Table 8), the addition
of a firm size control does not improve the
R2 as much, nor does it decrease (in abso-
lute value) the coefficient on the female
dummy as much (column 7 versus column
2).  Whether or not we control for age and
seniority, adding the three top occupation
dummies (column 8) leads to about the
same improvement in R2 as in column (3),
19We are not aware of any reason why age and
tenure are only reported for a subset of the data.  We
investigated how individual and firm characteristics
differ between our basic sample and the sample in
which age and tenure are available.  We found that
individuals in the subsample were slightly more likely
to be female (2.4% of the overall sample was female,
compared to 2.6% of the subsample) and worked for
smaller firms.
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where we do not control for age and tenure
at all.  The female dummy decreases (in
absolute value), from –0.14 to –0.04.  These
findings, while imprecise, indicate that the
gender compensation gap could be less
than 5% after all observables are controlled
for.20
Trends in Participation and Earnings:
Is the Glass Ceiling Cracking?
One of the major labor market trends in
the United States in the past two decades
has been the convergence in outcomes be-
tween men and women.  Focusing on differ-
ences in earnings, Blau and Kahn (1997)
showed that women’s relative position con-
siderably improved, especially during the
1980s, when men experienced a real de-
cline in earnings while female real wages
grew very rapidly.  They showed that part of
this shrinking gender pay gap could be
explained by an improvement in female
human capital, especially in the form of
labor market experience, and by a smaller
“unexplained” gender gap, that could re-
flect either a reduction in labor market
discrimination or an improvement in
women’s unmeasured characteristics.  Yet,
another important factor in explaining the
decline in the gender gap has been an
important shift in occupational categories
for women.  More specifically, the repre-
sentation of women in managerial and pro-
fessional jobs has been growing while the
share of women in low-paying clerical and
related jobs has not.
In this section, we address the question
of whether these trends also exist among
top executives.  In other words, we ask
whether there is any evidence that the glass
ceiling is cracking little by little in U.S.
corporations.  We ask whether the relative
participation of women in these top mana-
gerial jobs has increased over time, and
also study trends in relative compensation.
It is important to note that because our
data set only covers the period 1992–97, we
are unable to investigate relative gains in
the 1980s, the period during which most of
the catch-up by women occurred, at least in
the other segments of the labor market.
Table 9 reports trends over time in the
fraction of women in top-level management.
While the fraction of women in lower-level
management only went from 40% to 43%
over the sample period (column 9), the
fraction of women in top-level management
nearly tripled, going from 1.29% in 1992 to
3.39% (column 1) in 1997.21  The fraction
of firms with at least one woman in the top
executive ranks (one of the top 5 most
highly paid) grew from 5.4% in 1992 to
15.03% in 1997.  Although the fraction of
firms with strictly more than one woman in
these top positions was much smaller, it
also grew a great deal over the period, from
0.17% in 1992 to 1.95% in 1997.
Also note that the fraction of firms with
no women in one year and at least one
woman in the next year grew steadily over
time, from 2.19% in 1993 to 3.85% in 1997
(column 4).  Female top executives also
seem to have improved their relative earn-
ings quite substantially.  While the ratio of
average female to average male compensa-
tion in 1992 is a puzzle to us, it appears that
female relative compensation rose ex-
tremely quickly between 1993 (52%) and
1997 (73%).22  During these same years, we
find that the ratio of average female to
average male annual earnings in our CPS
20If we examine relatively new entrants to the top
managerial jobs—that is, men and women with only
five or fewer years of labor market experience—we
find that the conditional wage gap is also statistically
insignificant and the point estimate is not much
different from our estimate on the complete set of
data.  If we estimate a specification like that in Table
6, column (11), for the 5,113 executives with 5 years
of experience or less, the coefficient on the female
indicator is –0.093 with a standard error of 0.134.
21See Catalyst (1999) for descriptive evidence that
is consistent with this finding.
22Because we were concerned by possible changes
in the set of companies covered by ExecuComp over
time, we investigated the robustness of these findings
by limiting the sample to the companies that were
present in 1992.  The findings were unaffected.
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sample went from 67% to 72%.  In addi-
tion, in column (6) we have reported coef-
ficients on the female indicator from our
specification in column (11) of Table 6 by
running separate regressions by year.  The
substantial and statistically significant esti-
mate of –0.221 from 1992 declined through
the sample period to a statistically insignifi-
cant –0.013 in 1997.
Note, however, that the regressions-ad-
justed gap for managers in the CPS changed
much less over time (column 11).  What
caused such a rapid decline in the gender
gap for female managers at the top?  In the
previous section, we isolated two main fac-
tors that strongly hampered women’s rela-
tive earnings:  under-representation in large
firms, and under-representation in the top
four occupations.  Were female top execu-
tives in 1997 doing better on either of these
two fronts?  Column (7) of Table 9, which
displays the ratio of average female manag-
ers’ company size to average male manag-
ers’ company size, clearly indicates that
female executives were steadily gaining ac-
cess to larger U.S. corporations.23  On the
other hand, column (8) shows no evidence
that women’s representation in the top
occupational group (CEOs, Chairs, Vice
Chairs, and Presidents) was improving over
time.  If anything, women’s representation
in this group was declining, though not
steadily.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, contrary to what
some commentators have claimed, the “glass
ceiling” is somewhat porous and some
women, even if only a limited number, are
involved in the top-level management of
U.S. corporations.  Over all years in the
sample we examined, about 2.4% of the
executives were women.24  Although this
number is small, it increased substantially
in the later years of the sample period.
Our results further indicate that the gen-
der gap in compensation among top execu-
tives was at least 45%.  An important fact is
that female managers were under-repre-
sented in large corporations.  Because the
returns to firm size are very high among top
executives, this explains up to 15 percent-
age points of the gender gap.  Interestingly,
while female managers do not seem to have
been distributed randomly across indus-
tries, there is no evidence that sex segrega-
tion by industry explains any of the ob-
served gender gap.  On the other hand, we
found that sex segregation by occupation
was important.  The scarcity of female CEOs,
Chairs, Vice-Chairs, and Presidents accounts
for as much as half of the unconditional
gender compensation gap.  Once we look
beyond these four top occupations, how-
ever, there is no significant evidence of a
concentration of women in the lower-com-
pensation occupations.
A last crucial factor is that women in the
sample were much newer than their male
counterparts in this top stratum of manage-
rial jobs.  Women in the sample were much
younger, and had much less seniority in
their company, than men.  Part of the effect
of age and seniority on the gender gap
seems to be reflected in the size of compa-
nies women managed.  All in all, we find
that the unexplained gender compensa-
tion gap for top executives was less than 5%
after one accounts for all observable differ-
ences between men and women.
Finally, we asked whether there is any
evidence of a growing crack in the glass
ceiling over the period under study.  We
found that the participation of women in
the top corporate jobs was growing dra-
matically in the years we looked at, from
1.3% in 1992 to 3.4% in 1997.  Also, the
gender compensation gap declined, very
much like in the other segments of the
labor market.  Most of the decline appears
to have been correlated with a decline in
sex segregation by firm size.  Female top
executives were heading larger and larger
corporations.
Because top executives probably consti-
23This could be due to a lessening of employers’ or
customers’ tastes for discrimination or to changing
tastes on the part of the female executives themselves.
24This is still a small fraction relative to other
forms of organization.  For example, Hallock (1998)
found that about 20% of public charities are headed
by women.
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tute a fairly homogeneous group with re-
spect to job motivation, career commit-
ments, and human capital, a finding of an
unexplained gender compensation gap in
this sample could have reasonably been
interpreted as evidence for taste discrimi-
nation against women.  In fact, we find that
the conditional gender gap in this sample is
very small.  This obviously does not imply
the absence of discrimination.  Low gen-
eral participation, sex segregation by firm
size, and sex segregation by occupation
could reflect some form of taste discrimina-
tion.  The absence of a significant condi-
tional gender gap simply means that women
and men who held similar functions in
firms of similar size received fairly equal
treatment in terms of compensation.
Additional caveats should be stated here.
First, the latter results should not be gener-
alized to a claim that all female executives
in the United States are paid like their male
counterparts in the same occupation cat-
egory and in firms of the same size.  Inves-
tigating that issue would require a different
data set that, to our knowledge, does not
exist.  Second, one might argue that the
very few women who made it into our sample
are truly exceptional and should not in fact
be compared to the average man in the
sample but rather to the highest-ability men
in the sample.25  Under that view, one might
have expected that these women should
have been paid more than the average male
executives.  The data clearly reject a posi-
tive female-male gender gap in earnings.
Future work might involve a more for-
mal analysis of why some companies decide
to promote women to top jobs while others
do not.26  For example, one might inquire
whether various characteristics of the board
of directors, such as the sex and age distri-
bution of their members, are correlated
with the selection of women into top execu-
tive positions.  More fundamentally, one
might try to understand what factors make
small companies more likely to attract fe-
male top executives and why women are
virtually absent from the “very top” of the
U.S. corporate world.
25Our analysis has assumed that men and women
in our sample form a homogeneous group and that
the distribution of unobservables is similar across
genders.
26One might also investigate gender differences in
mobility.
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Appendix
Relative Pay, Percent Female, and Female/Male Wage Gaps by Broad “Field” Groups
High-Level Managers Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Field Wage/ Female/Male
Number in Female Market Wage Gap
Field Field in Field Wage in Field
Human Resources 343 14.86 0.89 0.60***
Finance/Accounting 1,682 2.02 1.01 1.41
Legal/Regulatory Affairs 258 10.85 1.28 0.51***
Sales 683 2.05 0.99 0.77
Marketing/Merchandising,
  Advertising 721 6.52 1.00 0.89
Product Devel.:  R&D, Engin.,
  Design 702 3.99 1.02 1.52
U.S. Operations 1,132 0.88 0.90 1.48
International Operations 332 1.20 1.25 1.81
Corporate Affairs 907 4.96 1.05 1.63
Customer Service 120 12.5 0.89 1.36
Product Management/
  Manufacturing 268 4.10 0.96 0.78
Real Estate/Construction 66 4.55 0.81 0.62
Utility Services 26 30.77 0.34 1.33
Retail Banking, Credit 84 16.67 0.74 0.98
Sourcing, Procurement 21 9.52 1.03 1.23
Administration 299 5.69 0.88 0.46***
Communication, Information 89 6.74 0.70 0.78
Healthcare 59 1.69 1.36 0.53a
Mergers & Acquisitions 50 0.00 0.91 NAa
Computers 38 2.63 1.40 0.93a
Developed Markets 7 42.86 2.84 1.78
Investment 35 2.86 1.99 0.13a
Distribution 30 3.33 0.70 0.48a
Missing 38,756 2.04 2.27 0.67***
aOnly one woman (or zero in the case of mergers) in these cases—no t test for differences in means.
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